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CASE NOTES
NEW MEXICO SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS
VALIDITY OF STATE ELECTRICAL ENERGY TAX

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRE-EMPTION, COMMERCE CLAUSE.

New Mexico Supreme Court upholds validity of New Mexico Electrical Energy Tax Act despite constitutional challenges that tax is
pre-empted by federal statute and is an impermissible burden on
interstate commerce.
In 1975 the New Mexico Legislature passed the Electrical Energy
Tax Act 1 [hereinafter EETA or the Act]. The EETA imposes a
four-tenths of one mill tax ($.0004) on each kilowatt hour of electricity generated in the State;2 this tax can be credited against the
gross receipts tax due in New Mexico if the electricity is consumed
within the State. 3 The Act makes no allowance for a credit against
the electrical generation tax for taxes paid on electricity sold outside
New Mexico.
Soon after the Act's passage two actions were commenced, one in
the district court of New Mexico and the other in the United States
Supreme Court. In the Supreme Court, the State of Arizona filed a
motion for leave to file a complaint 4 under the Court's original
jurisdiction over cases involving controversies between two or more
states.' The Court declined to exercise its original jurisdiction over
the case primarily because the constitutionality of the Act was already under consideration in New Mexico district court. 6
The district court action was commenced by five major public
utilities that generate electricity in New Mexico and sell part or all of
their electricity to non-New Mexico consumers. 7 During the pendency of this action, Congress passed a statute prohibiting states
from imposing discriminatory taxes on the generation of electricity. 8
The plaintiff utility companies moved for summary judgment. In
response, the district court granted summary judgment on a crossmotion filed by defendant Fred O'Cheskey, Commissioner of Revenue.
1. N.M. STAT. ANN. § §72-34-3 & 72-16A-16.1 (Supp. 1975).

2. Id. §72-34-3.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. §72-16A-16.1.
Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794 (1976).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794 (1976).
Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. O'Chesky, __N.M. __
, 576 P.2d 291, 293 (1978).
Tax Reform Act of 1976 §2121(a), 15 U.S.C. §391 (Supp. VI 1976).
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The plaintiff utility companies appealed the judgment and reasserted their contention that the tax imposed was an unconstitutional violation of the Supremacy 9 and Commerce Clauses' 0 of the
United States Constitution. Plaintiffs argued that the federal statute
prohibiting discriminatory state taxes on the generation of electricity, by operation of the Supremacy Clause, rendered the New
Mexico statute void. They also asserted that, notwithstanding the
federal statute prohibiting such taxes, the New Mexico tax was an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. In response to
these contentions, the New Mexico Supreme Court determined that
the EETA was not within the terms of the federal statute prohibiting
such taxes and that the tax was not a burden on interstate com1
merce. 1
THE FEDERAL PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATORY STATE TAXES
ON THE GENERATION OF ELECTRICITY
While the case was pending before the state district court, Congress enacted §2121(a) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,2 which
provides:
No state, or political subdivision thereof, may impose or assess a tax
on or with respect to the generation or transmission of electricity
which discriminates against out-of-state manufacturers, producers,
wholesalers, retailers, or consumers of that electricity. For purposes
of this section, a tax is discriminatory if it results, either directly or
indirectly, in a greater tax burden on electricity which is generated
and transmitted in interstate commerce than on electricity which is
generated in intrastate commerce. 13
On appeal, the utility companies argued that § 2121 (a) pre-empted
the EETA and rendered it invalid. The court analyzed the statutory
language defining "discriminatory" and concluded that the EETA
was not discriminatory within the meaning of § 2121 (a).
The court paid special attention to the phrase "greater tax burden." In interpreting the phrase, the court determined that "greater"
meant "larger," not "additional." Using this definition, the court
concluded that the tax burden on interstate, as opposed to intrastate,
commerce was the same, i.e., four-tenths of one mill on each kilowatt hour. The court was able to reach this conclusion by ignoring
9. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
11. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. O'Chesky,
-N.M.
-,
576 P.2d 291, 294 & 296
(1976).
12. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
13. Tax Reform Act of 1976 §2121(a), 15 U.S.C. §391 (Supp. VI 1976).
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any additional out-of-state taxes to which interstate electricity generated in New Mexico would be subject.
If the court had considered these out-of-state taxes, then it would
have been forced to conclude that the New Mexico tax resulted in a
"greater tax burden" for interstate electricity and was, therefore,
discriminatory within the meaning of the federal statutory definition. The greater tax burden on interstate electricity results from the
inability of the particular utility companies to credit any out-of-state
taxes paid on the sale of electricity against the New Mexico generation tax. The EETA allows a credit of the generation tax against
gross receipts tax for electricity generated and sold in New Mexico. It
is this credit that arguably causes the discrimination.
In response to the argument that the tax credit causes the discriminatory result, the court looked at the burden on the interstate electricity at the time it leaves the state as compared to the tax burden
on intrastate electricity at the time of delivery. Under this analysis,
the intrastate electricity is subject to the greater tax burden because
it is subject to a minimum of a four percent tax on gross sales,
whereas the interstate electricity is subject to only an approximate
two percent rate. Again, this analysis ignores any out-of-state taxes
to which the interstate electricity might be subject.
Looking at the express language of the statute, the court's interpretation of the words defining "discriminatory" is justified. The
statute speaks only of a "greater tax burden on electricity which is
generated and transmitted in interstate commerce ..."14 Arguably,
generation and transmission do not encompass delivery, which is the
point at which state taxes are normally computed. In view of this
reading of "transmission," the court was justified in ignoring out-ofstate taxes on electricity not levied during transmission.
The legislative history of the provision, however, requires a different interpretation of the definition of "discriminatory." In both the
Senate Finance Committee Report' ' and the General Explanation of
the Tax Reform Act of 1976 prepared by the Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation,' 6 it becomes clear that the generation tax
imposed by New Mexico was the kind intended to be prohibited by
the statute.
Congress has learned that one State places a discriminatory tax upon
14. Id.
15. S. REP. NO. 94-938 (Parts I & II), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 437, reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3865.
16. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976 638-639, reprintedin 1976-2 C.B.
650-651.
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the production of electricity within its boundaries. While the rate of
the tax itself is identical for electricity that is ultimately consumed
outside the State and electricity which is consumed inside the State,
discrimination results because the State allows the amount of the tax
to be credited against the gross receipts tax if the electricity is consumed within its boundaries. This credit normally benefits only
domiciliaries of the taxing State since no credit is allowed for electricity produced within the State and consumed outside the State.

As a result, the cost of the electricity to nondomiciliaries is normally
increased by the cost the producer of the electricity must bear in
paying the tax. However, the cost to domiciliaries of the taxing State
does not include the amount of the tax.
Congress believes that this is an example of discriminatory State
taxation which is properly within the ability of Congress to prohibit

through its power to regulate interstate commerce.1 7
The mention in the report to "one State" obviously refers to New
Mexico since it is the only State to have imposed such a tax. Where
the legislative history is so clear, it would be next to impossible for
the United States Supreme Court to sustain the interpretation given
by the New Mexico Court.
The only method of saving the EETA from invalidation would be
for the United States Supreme Court to find that the federal statute
prohibiting such tax is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress'
power to regulate commerce. New Mexico could argue that generating electricity is a purely local concern and, therefore, not part of
interstate commerce, which was the conclusion drawn by the United
States Supreme Court in Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost.1 8
Unfortunately, such an argument has no vitality in the light of two
decisions rendered subsequent to Utah Power & Light Co., namely,
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co.' " and Wickard v. Filburn.2 o
In Wrightwood, a case involving the power of Congress to regulate
the price of admittedly intrastate milk, the United States Supreme
Court found that Congress' commerce power could reach wholly
intrastate activities.
The commerce power is not confined in its exercise to the regulation

of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exertion of the
power of Congress over it, as to make regulations of them appro-

priate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the effective
17. Id.

18. 386 U.S. 165 (1932).
19. 315 U.S. 110 (1942).
20. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).

July 1978]

NEW MEXICO SUPREME COURT

execution of the granted power to regulate interstate commerce.

21

Even more forceful language appears in Wickard v. Filburn, a case
in which the Supreme Court upheld Congress' power to prohibit, as a
means of carrying out Congress' farm prices support program, the
growing of wheat soley for home consumption.
[E] yen if appellee's activity [the growing of wheat for home consumption] be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce,
it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether such an effect is what might at some earlier time
have been defined as "direct" or "indirect." 2 2
Clearly, the "substantial economic impact" required for triggering
Congress' power to regulate interstate activities is present in the
EETA. Congress, in light of these cases, has the power, exercised it,
and thereby prohibited state electrical generation taxes of the kind
enacted by New Mexico.
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE QUESTION

The utility companies also argued that the electrical generation
tax, by being a burden on interstate commerce, violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution and was therefore
unconstitutional. In answering this argument, the Court applied the
two traditional tests for determining whether state taxation on interstate commerce constitutes an undue burden. These were the discrimination and the multiple burden tests.
The utility companies contended that the application of EETA
was discriminatory because the credit allowed against the gross receipts tax resulted in an additional burden on interstate electricity
not borne by in-state sales of electricity generated in New Mexico. In
analyzing the alleged discriminatory nature of the energy tax, the
court asked whether the tax placed an additional burden on interstate commerce not borne by intrastate commerce, i.e., whether the
tax erected a barrier that put out-of-state businesses at a competitive
disadvantage.
In addressing the question of competitive disadvantage, the court
found none. The court, however, looked only at the effect of the tax
on out-of-state producers selling in New Mexico. As the court
pointed out, such producers are not subject to a generation tax, and
if they were, the statute provides for a credit against the New Mexico
21. 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942).
22. 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
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gross receipts tax for such an out-of-state tax. In the theoretical
sense, then, there can be no competitive disadvantage. As to the
in-state producers selling to out-of-state markets, the court noted no
competition with those producers selling in-state. Therefore, without
competition there could be no discrimination.
Needless to say, the discrimination test cannot appropriately be
applied to the sale of electricity. Electricity is sold by state regulated
monopolies. A monopoly can hardly be subject to a competitive
disadvantage where its customers are not free to buy the commodity
elsewhere.
The public utility companies next contended that the EETA was
discriminatory because of its sole and exclusive impact on interstate
commerce. The utility companies cited Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline
Co. v. Calvert,2 a United States Supreme Court case involving the
validity of a Texas statute imposing a tax on the occupation of
gathering gas (the initial extraction of gas from liquid hydrocarbons
for transmission in an established pipeline network). The Court held,
inter alia, that a state tax imposed on local activity is only valid if
that activity does not constitute such an integral part of the flow of
interstate commerce as to be realistically inseparable from it and that
allowing a state tax of this kind would establish the equal right in
other states to impose similar taxes on the same commodity, thereby
putting a multiple tax burden on interstate commerce.
The New Mexico court did not address the Supreme Court's holding prohibiting state taxes where the local activity is inextricably
linked to interstate commerce. The reason for this evasion is obvious:
the generation of electricity, although denominated a local activity
by the United States Supreme Court case of Utah Power & Light Co.
v. Pfost, is realistically inseparable from the transmission of electricity. However, the New Mexico court could have made use of
Calvert's discussion of Utah Power & Light Co. The Court in Calvert
distinguished Utah Power & Light Co., stating that the generation of
electricity is not like gathering gas; instead, it is, the Court noted,
clearly local in nature and not inextricably linked to interstate com24
merce.
Instead of addressing the connection of local activity to interstate
commerce, the New Mexico court focused on the multiple burden
test elicited in Calvert. The court distinguished the case on the
grounds that the generation of electricity, unlike the gathering of gas,
allows, by its very nature, only a one-time tax; the act of generating a
23. 347 U.S. 157 (1954).

24. Id. at 168.
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given amount of electricity can only occur once. Consequently, the
court reasoned, there could be no multiple burden because generation, unlike transmission, can occur only in one state. The generation
of electricity occurring in New Mexico can be taxed only by New
Mexico; therefore, multiple taxation on the act of generation is precluded.
The court's reasoning is sound only if Utah Power & Light Co.
remains a viable precedent. The case has never been overruled, yet its
reasoning stems from a time when the Supreme Court had the habit
of declaring unconstitutional New Deal legislation based on Congress'
power to regulate commerce. As a result, the continued vitality of
Utah Power & Light Co. depends on how the current United States
Supreme Court would decide the question of the local nature of
electrical power generation.
The United States Supreme Court, since Utah Power & Light Co.,
has had the opportunity to review the problem presented by state
taxation of electrical generation. In both instances a state court upheld a state tax on the generation of electricity, and in both cases the
Supreme Court declined review. In Public Utility Dist. No. 2 v.
State,2 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal question, even though the claims asserted by the
utility companies were similar to those presented in Utah Power &
Light Co. And in Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Haden,2" the
Supreme Court denied certiorari notwithstanding the decision of the
West Virginia Supreme Court upholding the validity of a state tax on
the manufacture of electricity in the face of claims made by the
public utilities that the tax was an unlawful burden on interstate
commerce.
The likelihood of the United States Supreme Court reaching the
question presented in Utah Power & Light Co. is small. It is far more
likely that the Court, if it accepts review, will determine that the
New Mexico energy tax is within the federal statutory prohibition of
such taxes. Such a determination, which is compelled by the applicable legislative history, would avoid the burden on interstate commerce issue.
CONCLUSION

Because of the posture of the case and the legal issues to be
addressed, the New Mexico Supreme Court was precluded from con25. 82 Wash.2d 232, 510 P.2d 206 (1973), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial
federal question, 414 U.S. 1106 (1974).
26. 200 S.E.2d 848 (W. Va. 1973), cert. denied 416 U.S. 916 (1974).
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sidering the question of a state's power to protect its citizens' physical and economic welfare through the taxation of activities that
produce deleterious effects on the general welfare of the populace
and that in turn benefit residents of other states. By consuming
electricity generated in New Mexico, Texas, Arizona, and California
have exported their air pollution and utility boomtown problems to
New Mexico and have used the Commerce Clause as a guise for
invalidating a tax designed to remedy the problems created by such
exportation. Clearly, if electrical generation plants existed in any one
of their states, resulting in enormous amounts of air pollution, stress
on local public services, and thousands of acres of strip-mined land,
they would legitimately expect such an industry to pay for the social
and environmental damage done. The prohibition of the electrical
energy tax will force New Mexico to assume more of the social and
environmental costs while other states enjoy the benefits of having
electricity without having to pay the social costs of generating it in
their own back yards.
SCOTT A. TAYLOR

